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Abstract
The appealing feature of Kiyotaki and Moores Financial Accelera-
tor model (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, 2002) is the linkage of asset price
changes and borrowing constraints. This framework therefore is the nat-
ural vehicle to explore the net worth channel of the monetary transmission
mechanism. In the original model, however, all the variables, credit in-
cluded, are in real terms. In order to assess the impact of monetary policy
the model must be reformulated to t a monetary economy. In the present
paper we model a monetary economy with nancing constraints adopt-
ing the Money In the Utility function (MIU) approach.The occurrence of
multiple equilibria is a likely outcome of the dynamics generated by the
model. A change in the growth rate of money supply can a¤ect real out-
put through the impact of ination on net worth. In a sense the monetary
transmission mechanism we are focusing on consists of a combination of
the ination tax e¤ect and the net worth channel. Contrary to the tra-
ditional view, at least for some parameter restrictions, an increase of the
ination tax can bring about an increase of aggregate output.
CeNDEF Working Paper Series WP 07-05
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1 Introduction
The impact of monetary policy economic activity has been and still is a funda-
mental question in macroeconomics. The literature has proposed several di¤er-
ent mechanisms to explain the propagation of monetary shocks. During the 90s
a remarkable body of literature has been developed under the name of nancial
accelerator or net worth channel to explore the transmission of monetary policy
on investment and production through the impact on rmsnancial structure.
The ambitious scope of this branch of literature consists in understanding the
mechanism through which adverse shocks, in particular a contractionary mon-
etary policy, a¤ect the decisions of rms, households, nancial intermediaries
and investors and cause large and persistent e¤ects on economic activity and
ination.
In the early 90s two alternative frameworks have been proposed to model
the Financial Accelerator hypothesis. Bernanke-Gertler (1989, 1990) and co-
authors emphasized the role of agency costs in the decision to supply credit
while Greenwald-Stiglitz (1988, 1993) focused on the role of bankruptcy costs
in limiting investment and production. In the late 90s Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997, 2002) put forward a new framework based on the idea that borrowers
face a nancing constraint because lenders extend credit up to the present value
of borrowerscollateralizable wealth, i. e. land, which proxies real assets. The
novel and appealing feature of their model is the linkage of asset price changes
and borrowing constraints: booming asset prices relax borrowing constraints
and boost economic activity; the upswing, in turn, a¤ects asset prices.
Thanks to this feature this model is the natural vehicle to explore the
balance-sheet channel of the monetary transmission mechanism.In the original
model, however, all the variables, credit included, are in real terms. Therefore
the model as such is not suitable to explore the e¤ects of monetary policy. In
order to assess the impact of a such a policy, the model must be reformulated to
t a monetary economy with borrowing constraint. An attempt in this direction
has been proposed by Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), who introduce a cash in ad-
vance constraint for consumption and investment to analyze the role of collateral
constraints as a trasmission mechanism of monetary shocks. The major result
of their model is that a monetary shock can generate persistent movements in
aggregate output. The amplitude of this movements depends on whether or not
debt contracts are indexed.
In our paper we follow a well known but di¤erent route. We model a mon-
etary economy with nancing constraints adopting the Money In the Utility
function (MIU) approach. 1
As in KM population consists of nancially constrained farmers and non
1The introduction of money in the utility function is a controversial but well known and
largely adopted modelling procedure in the monetary literature. A simple argument in favour
of such a procedure is that agents allocate time to shopping to purchase consumption goods
and that the amount of shopping time needed to purchase a certain level of consumption goods
is negatively related to agentsholdings of real money balances.For description of a shopping
time monetary economy see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), chapter 17.
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constrained gatherers. In the present framework, however, preferences are non
linear: they are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function whose argu-
ments are consumption and money holdings. As in in the original framework,
there are two types of goods, a non storable consumption good (fruit) and a
collateralizable, durable asset/input (land). The total supply of land is given
and constant.
By assumption the farmer and the gatherer have access to di¤erent tech-
nologies. The farmer is endowed with a linear technology while the gatherer
has a well behaved production function. Notice however, that since preferences
are non-linear in consumption, we must not assume that part of production is
non-tradable and that consumption is limited to bruised fruit as in Kiyotaki
and Moore.
In this setting, we study the e¤ects of a monetary injection on the asset price
and the allocation of land to the farmers and the gatherers. By assumption,
the farmer is less patient than the gatherer.2 Moreover, in equilibrium the real
interest rate is anchored to the rate of time preference of the gatherer. Since
the rate of time preference of the gatherer is exogenous, the real interest rate
is given and constant. As a consequence, a change of the ination rate brings
about the same change in the nominal interest rate. Finally, in the steady state
the ination rate is pinned down to the rate of growth of money supply. In
the end therefore, in the steady state a change of the rate of growth of money
supply brings about a change of the same sign and the same magnitude of the
nominal interest rate.
In the present context, therefore, by construction an expansionary monetary
policy cannot a¤ect real output through the liquidity e¤ect. By construction in
fact the liquidity e¤ect is not active because, in the end, an increase in the rate
of growth of money supply raises the ination rate and pushes the interest rate
up, not down. This does not necessarily mean, however, that superneutrality
always holds. A change in the growth rate of money supply can a¤ect real
output through the impact of ination on net worth. In a sense the monetary
transmission mechanism we are focusing on consists in a combination of the
ination tax e¤ect and the net worth channel. Contrary to the traditional
view, at least for some parameter restrictions, an increase of the ination tax
can bring about an increase of aggregate output.
The paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we discuss the opti-
mization problems of the farmer and the gatherer respectively. In section 4 we
present the equilibrium conditions and in section 5 we discuss the dynamics gen-
erated by the model. In particular we explore the e¤ects of a monetary shock.
In sections 6 and 7 we present the e¤ects on individual and aggregate variables
of unexpected and temporary shocks to the productivity parameter and to the
rate of growth of money supply respectively.
2Another way of characterizing the framework put forward by Kiyotaki and Moore, in fact,
is in terms of preference heterogeneity.
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2 The farmer/borrower
Preferences of both the farmer and the gatherer are dened over consumption
and real money balances. Adopting a Cobb-Douglas specication of the utility
function, preferences of the farmer are represented by:
UF =
1X
s=0

F
s 
 ln cFt+s + (1  ) lnmFt+s

(1)
where 0 <  < 1; cFt+s is consumption and m
F
t+s =
MFt+s
Pt+s
are real money
balances. We assume that the production function of the farmer has constant
returns to scale: yFt = K
F
t 1where y
F
t is output of the farmer, K
F
t 1 is land he
owns in t  1 and  > 0.3
The farmer maximizes utility subject to two constraints: the ow-of-funds
(FF) constraint and the nancing constraint. Following Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2000) we assume that at the beginning of period t the farmer decides the amount
of money he wants to hold at the beginning of period t+1. Therefore the farmers
ow of funds constraint in nominal terms is:
Pty
F
t +Bt +M
F
t  Qt
 
KFt  KFt 1

+NtBt 1 + PtcFt +M
F
t+1
where PtyFt is nominal income, M
F
t are money balances at the beginning of
period t, Bt is credit obtained in t, MFt+1 are money balances that the farmer
wants to hold at the beginning of period t + 1, Qt is the price of land and
Nt = 1 + it is the gross nominal interest rate.
Dividing by Pt we obtain the FF constraint in real terms:
cFt + (1 + t+1)m
F
t+1 + qt
 
KFt  KFt 1
  KFt 1 +mFt + bt  Rbt 1
where t+1 :=
Pt+1
Pt
  1 is the ination rate, qt := Qt
Pt
is the real price of land,
bt :=
Bt
Pt
is credit in real terms and R = 1 + r :=
1 + it
1 + t+1
is the real interest
rate.
In order to establish the way in which liquidity changes over time, lets as-
sume that each agent gets a transfer in money in t + 1 from the public sector
proportional to his money holdings in t: T it+1 = gMM
i
t ; i = F;G, where the
superscript F (G) denotes the farmer (gatherer). The supply of money, there-
fore, follows the law of motion M it+1 = M
i
t + T
i
t+1 = M
i
t (1 + gM ). In words,
money holdings grow at the (exogenous) rate gM . In order to keep the analysis
as simple as possible we assume that the rate of change of money supply gM is
uniform across agents. This means that the allocation of money to the agents,
i.e. the ratio of money of the farmer to money of the gatherer, is constant
3Since preferences are not linear in consumption we must not distinguish between tradable
output and bruised fruit as KM do.
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(which will be denoted by  in the following). Therefore real money balances of
the agent in t+ 1 are mit+1 :=
M it+1
Pt+1
=
M it
Pt
1 + gM
1 + t+1
= mit
1 + gM
1 + t+1
.
Substituting this relation into the FF constraint we get:
cFt + gMm
F
t  KFt 1  Rbt 1   qt
 
KFt  KFt 1

+ bt (2)
The term gMmFt =
MFt+1  MFt
Pt
is the increase in the farmers money hold-
ings between t and t + 1 in real terms, i.e. at prices of period t. For lack of a
better term we will refer to this magnitude as the increase in real money bal-
ances. In the light of this remark, (2) can be interpreted as follows: resources
of the farmer, of internal or external origin (KFt 1 and bt respectively), can be
employed to consume (cFt ), invest(qt
 
KFt  KFt 1

), reimburse debt (Rbt 1)
and increase money balances (gMmFt ). The increase in desired money balances
is always equal to the increase of liquidity engineered by the central bank by
means of money transfers. In other words, we are ruling out the mismatch
between desired and actual increase in money holdings.
The farmer is also nancially constrained, the nancing constraint can be
expressed as:
bt  qt+1
R
KFt (3)
The farmer maximizes (1) subject to the FF constraint (2) and the nancing
constraint (3). From the Lagrangian:
L =
1X
s=0

F
s 
 ln cFt+s + (1  ) lnmFt+s

+
+
1X
s=0

F
s
Ft+s

KFt 1+s  Rbt 1+s+
 qt+s
 
KFt+s  KFt 1+s

+ bt+s   gMmFt+s   cFt+s

+
+
1X
s=0

F
s
t+s
qt+1+s
R
KFt+s   bFt+s

we obtain the following FOCs:
(iF )
@L
@cFt
= 0 =) 
cFt
= Ft
(iiF )
@L
@cFt+1
= 0 =) 
cFt+1
= Ft+1
(iiiF )
@L
@mFt
= 0 =) 1  
mFt
= Ft gM
(ivF )
@L
@mFt+1
= 0 =) 1  
mFt+1
= Ft+1gM
(vF )
@L
@bFt
= 0 =) Ft   t  RFt+1F = 0
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(viF )
@L
@bFt+1
= 0 =) Ft+1   t+1  RFt+2F = 0
From (iF ) and (iiF ) follows that the FF constraint is binding in each period.
From (iF )-(ivF ) follows:
gMm
F
t =
1  

cFt 8t (4)
i.e. the ratio of the increase in money holdings gMmFt to consumption c
F
t is
constant and equal to
1  

. Notice that, given the rate of growth of money
supply gM ; the equality above states that the ratio of consumption to real money
balances is constant.
From (vF ) and (viF ) we conclude that the nancing constraint is binding if:
Ft
Ft+1
> FR (5)
Moreover after trivial substitutions we get:
Ft
Ft+1
=
cFt+1
cFt
=
mFt+1
mFt
(6)
i.e. consumption and real money balances should grow at the same rate. This
condition ensures that the ratio of consumption to real money balances remains
constant as implicitly stated in (4).
From (5) and (6) follows:
cFt+1
cFt
=
mFt+1
mFt
> FR
Notice that
mFt+1
mFt
=
1 + gM
1 + t+1
by construction. Therefore from (6) we conclude
that consumption grows at the rate
1 + gM
1 + t+1
.
In the end, the nancing constraint is binding if the following condition
holds:
1 + gM
1 + t+1
> FR
In the steady state real money balances are constant, i.e. the rate of growth
of money balances is equal to the ination rate gM = . The inequality above,
therefore, boils down to:
R <
1
F
The same condition holds also in the original KM framework. Since both
the ow of funds and the nancing constraints are binding, we can write
cFt + gMm
F
t = K
F
t 1   tKFt
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where t = qt 
qt+1
R
is the downpayment. In other words, the output produced
by the farmer is employed to consume, hold money balances and provide the
downpayment. Given output, the higher the rate of growth of nominal money
balances, the smaller consumption and/or downpayment, the smaller therefore
the investment in landholding.
Substituting the FOCs into the ow of funds constraint we get the optimal
level of consumption and real money balances:
cFt = 
 
KFt 1   tKFt

(7)
gMm
F
t = (1  )
 
KFt 1   tKFt

(8)
Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas specication of preferences, consumption and the
increase in real money balances are a fraction  and 1    respectively of the
resources available to the farmer, which in turn are equal to output less down-
payment.
Since both the FF and the nancing constraints are binding, from the very
denition of net worth in the present context, we can conclude that net worth
is equal to saving net of the increase in real money balances:
nFt = y
F
t   cFt   gMmFt  RbFt 1 + qtKFt 1 = sFt   gMmFt (9)
In KM nFt = s
F
t . The increase in real money balances therefore is a negative
component of net worth. In the steady state gM =  so that
nF = sF   mF
An increase in the rate of growth of money (which translates into an increase
of ination) has an ination tax e¤ect on the accumulation of net worth.
Making use of (4), after some algebra we can rewrite the equation above as:
nFt = K
F
t 1  
1

cFt = K
F
t 1   gMmFt
where  =
1
1   . In words: net worth is equal to output minus a multiple of
the increase in real money balances. Other things being equal the higher the
increase in real money balances, the lower net worth.
Finally notice that since the sum of consumption and the increase in real
money balances is equal to the resources available to the farmer, net worth is
devoted completely to downpayment:
nFt = y
F
t  
 
cFt + gMm
F
t

= yFt  
 
yFt   tKFt

= tK
F
t (10)
The same condition holds in KM. Considering (9) and (10) simultaneously we
infer that in a KM economy with money
nFt = s
F
t   gMmFt = tKFt
7
In the steady state
sF = KF + mF
Part of the resources of the farmer cannot be employed as downpayment because
they must be devoted to pay the ination tax.
After trivial substitutions from the ow of funds constraint one gets:
KFt =
1
t

KFt 1   gMmFt

(11)
Equation (11) is the law of motion of the land of the farmer. Notice that it
di¤ers from the law of motion obtained by KM due to the term that represents
the increase of real money balances. In particular there exists a negative relation
between the demand for land and the demand for money: the higher the real
money balances demanded by the farmer the lower landholding and viceversa.
In the steady state KF = KF + mF . An important implication of this
equation is that    m
F
KF
= : With the exception of a zero-ination steady
state, therefore,
 <  (12)
:
3 The gatherer/lender
Following the same modelling strategy of the previous section, we assume that
preferences of the gatherer are represented by a Cobb Douglas utility function:
UG =
1X
s=0

G
s 
 ln cGt+s + (1  ) lnmGt+s

(13)
where the meaning of the symbols is straightforward. Being unconstrained from
the nancial point of view, the gatherer maximizes utility subject only to the
ow of funds constraint.
We assume that the production function of the gatherer has decreasing re-
turns to scale:yGt = G
 
KGt 1

with G0 > 0, G00 < 0. We assume moreove that
the Inada conditions are fullled.
The ow of funds constraint of the gatherer at current prices is:
Pty
G
t +NtBt 1 +M
G
t  Qt
 
KGt  KGt 1

+Bt + Ptc
G
t +M
G
t+1 + 'M
G
t
where 'MGt , 0 < ' < 1, are reserves that the gatherer keeps as a bu¤er stock to
carry on the lending business smoothly. The gatherer, in fact, in this context
(as in KM) plays the role of the lender. We can think of ' as a policy parameter,
possibly established by the central bank in his role of regulator/supervisor of
the banking system or as a rough measure of transaction cost due to nancial
frictions. At the beginning of period t the nominal money balances available
to the gatherer are MGt (1  ').
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Following the modelling strategy already adopted for the farmer we can write
the ow of funds constraint of the gatherer in real terms as follows:
cGt + qt
 
KGt  KGt 1

+ bt + (1 + t+1)m
G
t+1  G
 
KGt 1

+Rbt 1 + (1  ')mGt
Recalling that
mGt+1
mGt
=
1 + gM
1 + t+1
and rearranging, the ow of funds constraint
becomes:
cGt + qt
 
KGt  KGt 1

+ bt + (gM + ')m
G
t  G
 
KGt 1

+Rbt 1 (14)
The term (gM + ')mGt =
MGt+1   (1  ')MGt
Pt
is the increase in the gatherers
money holdings between t and t+1 in real terms, i.e. at prices of period t. Ac-
cording to (14) the resources of the gatherer, i.e. the sum of output G
 
KGt 1

and interest payments Rbt 1, can be employed to invest (qt
 
KGt  KGt 1

), in-
crease money holdings ((gM + ')mGt ), consume (c
G
t ) and extend credit to the
farmer (bt).
The maximization problem of the gatherer is:
max
1X
s=0

G
s 
 ln cGt+s + (1  ) lnmGt+s

s:t: cGt + qt
 
KGt  KGt 1

+ bt + (gM + ')m
G
t  G
 
KGt 1

+Rbt 1
From the Lagrangian:
L =
1X
s=0

G
s 
 ln cGt+s + (1  ) lnmGt+s

+
+
1X
s=0

G
s
Gt+s

G
 
KGt 1+s

+Rbt 1+s+
 qt+s
 
KGt+s  KGt 1+s
  bt+s   (gM + ')mGt+s   cGt+s
we obtain the following FOCs:
(iG)
@L
@cGt
= 0 =) 
cGt
= Gt
(iiG)
@L
@cGt+1
= 0 =) 
cGt+1
= Gt+1
(iiiG)
@L
@mGt
= 0 =) 1  
mGt
= (gM + ')
G
t
(ivG)
@L
@mGt+1
= 0 =) 1  
mGt+1
= (gM + ')
G
t+1
(vG)
@L
@bGt
= 0 =)  Gt + GRGt+1 = 0
(viG)
@L
@bGt+1
= 0 =)  Gt+1 +RGFt+2 = 0
9
(viiG)
@L
@KGt
= 0 =)  Gt qt + GGt+1

G0
 
KGt

+ qt+1

= 0
From (iG)-(ivG) follows that the ow of funds constraint of the gatherer is
binding in each period. Moreover:
(gM + ')m
G
t =
1  

cGt 8t (15)
i.e. the ratio of the increase in money holdings (gM + ')mGt to consumption
cGt is constant and equal to
1  

. Considering (vG) and (viG) we reach the
following conclusion:
Gt
Gt+1
=
cGt+1
cGt
=
mGt+1
mGt
= GR
In words: real money balances and consumption must grow at the same rate
GR.
From the assumption
mGt+1
mGt
=
1 + gM
1 + t+1
follows:
1 + gM
1 + t+1
= GR
In the steady state gM =  so that:
R =
1
G
(16)
i.e. the real interest rate is pinned down to the rate of time preference of the
gatherer (as in KM).
Since the rate of time preference of the gatherer is exogenous, the real interest
rate is given and constant. As a consequence, a change of the ination rate
brings about the same change in the nominal interest rate. In the steady state
the ination rate is pinned down to the rate of growth of money supply. In
the end therefore, in the steady state a change of the rate of growth of money
supply brings about a change of the same sign and the same magnitude of the
nominal interest rate.
Lets recall now that from the maximization problem of the farmer we have
obtained:
1 + gM
1 + t+1
> FR (17)
From (16) and (17) we infer that:
G > F (18)
Therefore we can conclude that the farmer is the more impatient agent as in
KM.
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Substituting the nancing constraint into the ow of funds constraint and
recalling that both constraints are binding be set:
cGt + (gM + ')m
G
t = G
 
KGt 1

+ tK
F
t (19)
Equation (19) states that the resources of the gatherer, i.e. output and the
downpayment received from the farmer, can be employed to consume and in-
crease money balances.
Substituting (vG) into (viiG) we get:
 Gt qt +
Gt
R

G0
 
KGt

+ qt+1

= 0
from which, using (iG), we obtain:
G0
 
KGt

= Rt (20)
Once again, we get the same condition obtained by KM which equates the
present value of the marginal productivity of the gatherer to the downpayment.
Finally substituting the FOCs we determine the optimal level of consump-
tion and real money balances for the gatherer:
cGt = 

G
 
KGt 1

+ tK
F
t

(21)
(gM + ')m
G
t = (1  )

G
 
KGt 1

+ tK
F
t

(22)
Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas specication of preferences, consumption and the
increase of real money balances are a fraction  and 1    respectively of the
resources available to the gatherer, which in turn are equal to the sum of the
output and the downpayment of the farmer.
4 Equilibrium
Total consumption in t is equal to the sum of the optimal consumption of the
farmer and the gatherer. Recalling (7) and (21) we can write:
ct = c
F
t + c
G
t = 

KFt 1 +G
 
KGt 1

In words, consumption in t is a share  of total production available in the same
period, yt = KFt 1 +G
 
KGt 1

.
We assume that Government expenditure is gt = (1  ) yt i.e. the public
sector plays the role of buyer of last resort purchasing all the output not
consumed by the private sector. The aggregate resource constraint ct + gt = yt
is always satised.
Since by construction there are no taxes, gt represents also the public sector
decit, which we assume is nanced by means of money. The change of money
supply between beginning-of-period t and beginning-of-period t+1, i.e. Mt+1 
Mt, is equal to nominal Government expenditure Ptgt. Hence gt = gMmFt +
11
(gM + ')m
G
t . Therefore agents end up saving a portion (1  ) yt of total
income in the form of real money balances.
In fact from (4) and (15) follows:
cFt + c
G
t =

1  

gMm
F
t + (gM + ')m
G
t

from which we get:
KFt 1 +G
 
KGt 1

(1  ) = gMmFt + (gM + ')mGt
or
(1  ) yt = gMmFt + (gM + ')mGt (23)
We assume also that the ratio between the real money balances of the gath-
erer and the farmer is constant over time:
mGt
mFt
:= . Substituting into (23) we
get:
(1  ) yt = gMmFt + (gM + ')mFt
After trivial algebra :
mFt =
1  
gM (1 + ) + '

KFt 1 +G
 
KGt 1

(24)
5 Dynamics
In order to compare our results with those obtained by KM we recall that
in a real KM economy tK
F
t = K
F
t 1; i.e. tradable output is equal to the
downpayment, whereas t = G
0  KGt  =R, i.e. the downpayment is equal to the
discounted value of the marginal productivity of the gatherers land. Therefore
G0
 
K  KFt

R
= KFt 1. The steady state is represented in gure 1.
In a monetary KM economy such as the present one, the dynamic system
obtained by the maximization problems of the farmer and the gatherer consists
of equations (11), (20), (24) and the denition of the downpayment, which we
rewrite for convenience of the reader:8>>>><>>>>:
tK
F
t = K
F
t 1   gMmFt
G0
 
KGt

= Rt
mFt =
1  
gM (1 + ) + '

KFt 1 +G
 
KGt 1

t = qt  
qt+1
R
Notice that the RHS of the rst equation represents net worth. Substituting
the third equation into the RHS of the rst one we get:
nFt = y
F
t   gMmFt = yFt (1 A) AyGt (25)
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Figure 1: Steady state in KMs framework
where
A := gM
1  
gM (1 + ) + '
=
1
(1 + ) +
'
gM
is a polynomial of policy parameters: gM , ' and . It is easy to verify that
0 < A < 1 and that A is increasing with gM and decreasing with ' and .
Therefore, recalling that K = KFt +K
G
t , the RHS of the rst equation can
be expressed as a function of KFt 1 as follows:
nFt = K
F
t 1  A

G
 
K  KFt 1

+ KFt 1

(26)
It is easy to see that nFt is an increasing convex function of K
F
t 1. In fact:
dnFt
dKFt 1
=  (1 A) +AG0   K  KFt 1 = +A G0   K  KFt 1   > 0
d2nFt
d
 
KFt 1
2 =  AG00   K  KFt 1 > 0
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since G00
 
K  KFt 1

< 0.
Notice now that nFt = 0 i¤ y
F
t (1 A) = AyGt i.e. i¤:
h
 
KFt 1

:=
G
 
K  KFt 1

KFt 1
=
1
A
  1 =

1 +
'
gM

 (27)
h
 
KFt 1

is the ratio of output of the gatherer to output of the farmer, h0 < 0.
Moreover limKFt 1!0 h
 
KFt 1

= +1 and h   K = G (0)
 K
= 0.
( )FtKh 1-
F
tK 1-
s
j
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Figure 2: Determination of K^F
Solving (27) forKFt 1 yields a threshold level of K
F
t 1, say K^
F = h 1

 (1 A)
A

such that if KFt 1 < K^
F , then nFt < 0 and the farmer goes bankrupt. We will
deal therefore only with the case KFt 1 > K^
F . In particular this threshold is
a function of the policy parameters ' and gM . The determination of K^F is
represented in g. 2. It is immediate to conclude that an expansionary policy
move for instance an increase of gM increases the threshold K^F (compare
points H and J in the gure).
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Figure 3: The farmers net worth
In gure 3 net worth is represented as a function of the farmers landholding
according to equation (26). This graph shows the new shape of the Net Worth
(NW) curve in a monetary KM economy. There are three di¤erences with
respect to the NW curve in a real KM economy represented by the straight line
of equation aKFt 1 which represents tradable output.
First, the curve crosses the x-axis at K^F instead of the origin. This means
that net worth becomes negative (a condition for bankruptcy) when too much
land is in the hand of the gatherer. We focus on the case of solvent farmers
and therefore rule out the dashed portion of the NW curve. Second, a nominal
shock can a¤ect the position on the plane of the curve. In particular a monetary
injection shifts the curve down. On the contrary, by construction, a nominal
shock has no e¤ect on the NW schedule in a real KM economy. Third, in a
monetary economy the NW curve undergoes a convexication. This is due to
the fact that also the gatherers production indirectly a¤ects the farmers net
worth through the money market. An expansionary policy move for instance
an increase of gM which makes A go up has also the e¤ect of increasing the
slope of the NW curve if G0 >  and of reducing it if G0 < . The slope remains
the same in G0 = .
15
Figure 4: The DD-NW diagram. The case of a unique unstable steady state.
On the other hand the DD curve, which represents total downpayment tK
F
t
is exactly the same as in KM. Therefore we can envisage three scenarios. In the
rst one there is no intersection between the two curves (not shown). In the
second one there is one intersection between the two curves (as shown in gure
4). It is easy to see that the steady state is unstable. Finally the third and
most interesting case is represented in gure 5 where the NW curve intersects
the DD curve twice. It is easy to reach the conclusion that the equilibrium S1
is stable while S0 is unstable.
Substituting the second and the third equations of the dynamic system into
the rst one we get:
G0
 
K  KFt

R
KFt = K
F
t 1 (1 A) AG
 
K  KFt 1

= (28)
= KFt 1  A

G
 
K  KFt 1

+ KFt 1

Substituting the fourth equation into the second one and adapting the time
index we get:
qt = Rqt 1  G0
 
K  KFt 1

(29)
16
Figure 5: The DD-NW diagram. Multiple equilibria.
We end up therefore with the system (28) (29) of two non linear di¤erence
equations in the state variables KFt and qt. The system is recursive. The
dynamics of KFt in fact, is independent of the dynamics of qt.
Lets focus on (28) rst. It is a rst order non-linear di¤erence equation in
Kt. In order to study the properties of the steady state, at least qualitatively, we
have to sketch the phase diagram. Applying the implicit function di¤erentiation
theorem to:
f
 
KFt ;K
F
t 1

= G0( K  KFt )KFt   KFt 1R (1 A) +RAG
 
K  KFt 1

= 0
which is another way of writing (28) we obtain:
dKFt
dKFt 1
= R
+A

G0
 
K  KFt 1
  
 G00( K  KFt )KFt +G0( K  KFt )
Notice now that:
"t =  G
00( K  KFt )KFt
G0( K  KFt )
=
@G0( K  KFt )
@KFt
KFt
G0( K  KFt )
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is the (non-negative) elasticity of the marginal productivity of the land of the
gatherer with respect to the land of the farmer. Hence the slope of the phase
diagram is:
dKFt
dKFt 1
= R
+A

G0
 
K  KFt 1
  
("t + 1)G0( K  KFt )
> 0 (30)
Notice also that when KFt ! K, G0(0) ! 1, thanks to one of Inadas
conditions. Moreover elasticity tends to " K =
 G00 (0) K
G0 (0)
= 0. Hence:
dKFt
dKFt 1
KFt = K = 0
It is straightforward to conclude therefore that the phase diagram of (28) is
increasing and concave (see g. 7).
The phase diagram of (28) is reminiscent of the analogous phase diagram
derived in the original KM case. At a glance the major qualitative di¤erence is
the fact that the origin is not belonging to the phase diagram any more. The
introduction of real money balances into the model leads to a shiftdownward
of the phase diagram that now cuts the x-axis with a positive intercept KFt 1 =
K^F .
In a sense this is obvious because in the present context the farmer devotes
part of his resources (consisting of output and credit) to money holdings. For
each level of land inherited from the past, therefore, the amount of new land he
can buy is smaller than in the original KM case.
Once again in the present context we can envisage three scenario. The phase
diagram may not cross the 45 line at all, may be tangent or may cross the 45
line twice. In the rst case there are no steady states (not shown). If the phase
diagram is tangent to the 45 line, trajectories starting from initial conditions
above (below) the steady state S, converge to the steady state (diverge) (see
g. 6). Finally in the third case there are two steady states (see g. 7).
We have only one steady state if the 45 line is tangent to the phase diagram.
This occurs if KFt 1 = K
F
t = K
F
s , where K
F
s is the unique steady state, and
simultaneously the slope of the phase diagram is equal to 1. This is the case i¤:
A = A^ :=
R G0   K  KFs  ("s + 1)
R

 G0   K  KFs 
5.1 Multiple equilibria
Lets assume now that:
A < A^ (A1)
Due to A1 there are two steady states. In other words A is such that there exist
two intersections between the 45 line and the phase diagram.
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Figure 6: Phase diagram. The case of a unique steady state
Lets go back now to the system (28) (29). In the steady state KFt 1 = K
F
t =
KF and qt 1 = qt = q so that equation (29) becomes:
q =
G0
 
K  KF 
R  1 (31)
(31) is the steady state asset price equation. It establishes a positive link be-
tween the farmers landholdings and the price of land in the steady state.
Notice now that in the steady state  = q where  = 1  1
R
. Therefore (28)
becomes:
q =



(1 A) Ah  KF  = 


1 A h  KF + 1	 (32)
where h
 
KF

=
G
 
K  KF 
KF
; h0
 
KF

< 0 (see above).
(32) is the farmers landholding equation. In the steady state landholding is
increasing with the price of land. In a sense (31) and (32) are the equivalent of
isoclines in discrete time. The asset price equation denes the steady state asset
19
Figure 7: Phase Diagram: the case of multiple equilibria.
price as the sum of the discounted marginal productivities of the gatherers land
(uniform across periods in the steady state) over an innite horizon. The higher
KF , in the steady state, the lower KG = K   KF , the higher the marginal
productivity and therefore the price of land q.
The storyone can tell to give the economic intuition of (31) is less straight-
forward. One interpretation is as follows. The higher q, the higher the downpay-
ment  = q will be, the smaller should be therefore the amount of resources
the farmer devotes to money holdings mF . In equilibrium, a smaller money
holding is brought about by a higher landholding KF .
In order to study the steady state, lets consider the system (31) and (32)
which we rewrite here for convenience of the reader8><>: q =
G0
 
K  KF 
R  1
q =



(1 A) Ah  KF  (33)
(33) is a system of two equations which can be solved for the steady state values
of KF and q: The second equation yields an increasing relationship between q
20
and KF . It crosses the x-axis when KF = h 1

 (1 A)
A

= K^F . If KF ! 0
then q !  1, while if KF = K then q = 

(1 A). Therefore we conclude
that, in the domain of interest, the second equation yields an increasing and
concave relationship between q and KF . On the other hand, the rst equation
yields an increasing and convex relationship between q and KF on the
 
KF ; q

plane. It crosses the y-axis when q =
G0
 
K

R  1 . When K
F ! K then q !1.
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Figure 8: Steady state loci
We can explore di¤erent scenarios. In fact, given the properties of the two
relations above we can obtain one, two or no steady states depending on the
level of the policy parameter (A). Thanks to assumption A1 we focus only on
the case of multiple steady states (see g. 8).4
In order to assess the properties of each of the two steady states, we linearize
4 In order to obtain a closed form solution for the steady state we should specify the
production function G (:). We could obtain very complicated closed form solutions without
much insight. Therefore we do not proceed on this route.
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the system (33) around each steady state and compute the jacobian matrix:
Ji =
"
R(1 A)+RAG0( K KFi )
("i+1)G0( K KFi )
0
G00
 
K  KFi

R
#
(34)
with i = 0; 1.
Ji is a lower triangular matrix. Therefore the eigenvalues coincide with the
elements on the main diagonal. One of the eigenvalues is R > 1. The second
eigenvalue
R (1 A) +RAG0   K  KFi 
("
i
+ 1)G0( K  KFi )
coincides with the slope of the phase
diagram of (28) in the steady state. In particular we observe that the slope is
greater than one in the lower steady state S0 (i = 0) while it is smaller than
one in the higher steady state S1 (i = 1). In the latter case therefore the steady
state is a saddle point. This means that there is only one trajectory on the 
KFt ; qt

phase space which is converging to the steady state S1, i.e. the saddle
path. All the other trajectories diverge.
Figure 9: E¤ects of an expansionary monetary policy when the initial condition
is S1
Notice that A is an increasing function of the rate of growth of money supply.
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In g. 9 the convex solid line represents equation (31), that is independent from
A. The concave solid line represents equation (32). Lets assume that the
economy lies in the higher steady state (S1). Suppose that an expansionary
monetary policy increases A. The concave curve shifts down: the new situation
is represented by the dotted line. Assuming that qt jumps down to the new
saddle path, the economy follows a trajectory which converges to the new saddle
point (S
0
1). In other words in the end an increase of the rate of growth of the
money supply yields a decrease of the farmers landholding and of the asset
price.
5.2 Net worth, money balances and the ination tax
Notice that in the long run gM = , i.e. a change in the rate of growth
of money supply translates into a change in the rate of ination of the same
magnitude. Therefore the long run impact of the monetary expansion on the
real price of land can be attributed to an ination tax e¤ect.
In order to assess the overall impact of the policy move, we recall that
aggregate output is dened as Yt = f
 
KFt 1

where f
 
KFt 1

= KFt 1 +
G
 
K  KFt 1

. Therefore aggregate output is a non monotonic function of the
farmers landholding. In particular it is easy to conclude that Yt is an increasing
(resp. decreasing) function ofKFt 1 if  > G
0   K  KF  ( < G0   K  KF ). In
other words Yt is an increasing (resp. decreasing) function ofKFt 1 ifK
F
t 1 < K
F
f
(KFt 1 > K
F
f ) where K
F
f =
K G0 1 () is the farmers landholding which max-
imizes aggregate output. In the case of the higher steady state, Y1 = f
 
KF1

Proposition 1 Starting from S1, so that KFt 1 = K
F
t = K
F
1 and Y1 = f
 
KF1

,
an expansionary policy move (i.e. an increase of A due to an increase of the
rate of growth of the money supply) has a positive long run e¤ect on aggregate
output i¤ KF1 > K
F
f and K
F
1 < K
0F
1 < K
F
1 , where K
F
1 is such that f
 
KF1

=
f
 
KF1

. On the other hand an expansionary policy move has a negative e¤ect
on aggregate output i¤ KF1 > K
F
f and K
0F
1 < K
F
1 or i¤ K
F
1  KFf 8 K
0F
1 .
In gure 10 we represent the e¤ects of an expansionary policy move in the
case with KF1 > K
F
f and K
F
1 < K
0F
1 < K
F
1 . As claimed in the proposition
above an increase of the rate of growth of money supply i.e. an increase of the
ination tax has a positive e¤ect on aggregate output. This counterintuitive
result is due to the fact that following the decrease in the steady state farmers
landholding from KF1 to K
0F
1 , the economy moves along the downword sloping
branch of the aggregate output function: The loss of output due to the reduction
in farmers landholding is more than o¤set by the increase of output due to the
increase of the gatherers landholding.
The opposite holds true if the economy moves along the upward sloping
branch as exemplied in g. 11.
23
Figure 10: Positive e¤ect of an expansionary policy move on aggregate output.
6 The e¤ects of an unexpected productivity shock
In this section, following the original KM approach we analyze the e¤ects of a
small unexpected and temporary shock to technology on output and asset prices
by means of a linear approximation around the saddle point.
Suppose that at time 0 the economy is in the saddle point and an unexpected
technological shock occurs so that the productivity of the farmer increases from
0 to 1. As in KM we assume that the farmer decides whether to supply labour
or not before the shock. If the farmer chooses to cultivate land, when the shock
occurs it is too late to change his mind.Moreover the shock is temporary, i.e.
the parameter  goes back to 0 immediately after the shock.
In order to study the e¤ects of a shock to productivity, we start from the
denition of net worth, i.e. the sum of tradable output
 
KFt 1

and the current
value of real assets
 
qtK
F
t 1

net of interest payments
 
RbFt 1

and of (a multiple
of) the increase in real money balances (gMmFt ):
nFt = (+ qt)K
F
t 1  Rbt 1   gMmFt
Net worth is employed as downpayment, i.e. nFt = tK
F
t . Moreover Rt =
24
Figure 11: Negative e¤ect of an expansionary policy move on aggregate output
G0
 
K  KFt

and mFt =
1  
gM (1 + ) + '

KFt 1 +G
 
KGt 1

:Therefore:
G0
 
K  KFt

R
KFt = [ (1 A) + qt]KFt 1  AG
 
K  KFt 1
 Rbt 1 (35)
At time 0, before the shock, nF0 = 0 (1 A)KF0 +q0KF0  Rb0 AG
 
K  KF0

and q0KF0 = Rb0 i.e. the current value of the farmers land is equal to interest
payments on debt inherited from the past so that (35) boils down to:
G0
 
K  KF0

R
KF0 = (1 A)0KF0  AG
 
K  KF0

(36)
Suppose now that in the same period the productivity parameter goes up by
 = 1   0. By assumption, the rst round e¤ect of the shock on net
worth concerns tradable output and the price of land, given the (steady state)
landholding of the farmer KF0 . Immediately after the shock, net worth becomes
nFAS = [(0 +) (1 A) + (qt   q0)]KF0  AG
 
K  KF0

(37)
25
since interest payments have been predetermined on the basis of the steady state
price of land: q0KF0 = Rb0:The rst round e¤ect of the shock creates a wedge
between the current (after shock) value of land qtKF0 and interest payments
q0K
F
0 . In particular, as will be clear in the following, the current price of land
jumps from q0 to qt creating an (unexpected) capital gain.
Substituting (37) into the RHS of (35) we obtain
G0
 
K  KFt

R
KFt = [(0 +) (1 A) + (qt   q0)]KF0  AG
 
K  KF0

(38)
which describes the impact of the shock on KFt .
Assuming that the shock is temporary, in period 1 and all the following
periods the situation goes back to normal, i.e.
nFt+s = 0 (1 A)KFt+s 1 AG
 
K  KFt+s 1

=
G0
 
K  KFt+s

R
KFt+s s = 0; 1; :::
(39)
Consider now (38). Lets take a rst order approximation of the LHS in KF0 :
G0
 
K  KFt

R
KFt 
G0
 
K  KF0

R
KF0 +
G0
 
K  KF0

R
("0 + 1)
 
KFt  KF0

(40)
where:
"0 =
 G00   K  KF0 KF0
G0
 
K  KF0
 KF0
is the elasticity of the marginal productivity of the land of the gatherer with
respect to the land of the farmer evaluated in the steady state KF0 .
The rate of change of total downpayment, i.e. of the LHS of (40), relative
to the steady state is
"
G0
 
K  KFt

R
KFt =
G0
 
K  KF0

R
KF0
#
  1. Denoting the
rate of change of a variable with respect to the steady state with a hat, the rate
of change of the LHS becomes:
\tKFt = ("0 + 1) K^Ft (41)
where K^Ft =
KFt  KF0
KF0
is the rate of change of the farmers landholding.
On the other hand, the rate of change of net worth, i.e. of the RHS of (38), is
[(0 +) (1 A) + (qt   q0)]KF0  AG
 
K  KF0

0 (1 A)KF0  AG
 
K  KF0
  1. But q01  1
R

K0 =
0K0 =
G0
 
K  KF0

R
K0 = 0 (1 A)KF0  AG
 
K  KF0

so that the rate of
change of the RHS becomes:
n^FAS = ^ (1 A)
0
q0
R
R  1 + q^t
R
R  1 (42)
26
where ^ =

a0
and q^t =
qt   q0
q0
are the rates of change of the farmers produc-
tivity and of the price of land.
After the productivity shock, the farmers net worth goes up for two reasons:
the direct e¤ect ^ (1 A) 0
q0
R
R  1 and the indirect e¤ect through asset prices
q^t
R
R  1 . Notice that 0 < A < 1. Moreover in our context, as stated in (12)
0 = q0
R  1
R
< 0: Hence the ratio of the productivity to the downpayment
0
q0
R
R  1 ,which we will denote with 0 in the following, is greater than one. In
symbols 0 :=
0
q0
R
R  1 > 1:
In the original KM framework the rate of change of the farmers net worth is
n^FAS = ^+ q^t
R
R  1 . From a comparison with (42) it is clear that in the present
model the indirect e¤ect is specied exactly as in KM while the direct e¤ect
^ (1 A) 0 is greater than ^ (as in KM) if A < 1  1
0
. The smaller the policy
parameter A, the higher the direct e¤ect of the productivity shock on the rate
of change of net worth after the shock.
Equating (41) and (42) we get
("0 + 1) K^
F
t = ^ (1 A) 0 + q^t
R
R  1 (43)
We have to determine now how the asset price qt changes over time. Follow-
ing KM, we note that from the denition of the downpayment and (20) follows
qt =
G0
 
K  KFt

R
+
qt+1
R
, qt+1 =
G0
 
K  KFt+1

R
+
qt+2
R
and so on. Substi-
tuting the second expression in the rst one and iterating the procedure we end
up with:
qt =
G0
 
K  KFt

R
+
G0
 
K  KFt+1

R2
+ ::: =
1X
s=0
R s
G0
 
K  KFt+s

R
(44)
i.e. the current price of land is equal to the present value of the stream of future
downpayments over an innite horizon.
Taking a rst order approximation of G0
 
K  KFt+s

in KF0 , we can write
G0
 
K  KFt+s
  G0   K  KF0  G00   K  KF0   KFt+s  KF0 . Noting that this
approximation holds true for any time period s, equation (44) boils down to:
qt =
1X
s=0
R s
G0
 
K  KF0
 G00   K  KF0   KFt+s  KF0 
R
Recalling that
P1
s=0R
 s =
R
R  1 and that
G0
 
K  KF0

R
= q0
R  1
R
, from the
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expression above we obtain:
q^t =
1
q0
 G00   K  KF0 
R
1X
s=0
R s
 
KFt+s  KF0

Notice now that
1
q0
 G00   K  KF0 
R
=
 G00   K  KF0 
G0
 
K  KF0
 R  1
R
=
"0
KF0
R  1
R
.
Moreover
P1
s=0R
 sKF0 = K
F
0
R
R  1 . Therefore q^t = "0
R  1
R
P1
s=0R
 sK^Ft+s.
In the end we obtain:
q^t = "0
R  1
R
1X
s=0
R s

1
"0 + 1
s
K^Ft
Moreover
P1
s=0R
 s

1
"0 + 1
s
=
P1
s=0

1
R ("0 + 1)
s
=
R ("0 + 1)
R ("0 + 1)  1 . There-
fore
q^t = "0
(R  1) ("0 + 1)
R ("0 + 1)  1 K^
F
t (45)
Solving (43) and (45) for q^t and K^Ft yields
q^t = "0 (1 A) 0^ (46)
K^Ft =
R ("0 + 1)  1
(R  1) ("0 + 1) (1 A) 0^ (47)
The rate of change of net worth n^FAS = (1 A) 0

1 +
R
R  1"0

^ is larger
than the rate of growth of productivity thanks to the indirect e¤ect of the shock
on the price of land. The rate of change of total downpayment ("0 + 1) K^Ft
should match to keep equilibrium on the market for land. Therefore the rate
of change of landholding is a multiple of the rate of change of productivity. In
fact the multiplier
1
"0 + 1

1 +
R
R  1"0

is greater than one.
7 The e¤ects of an unexpected monetary shock
In this section we analyze the e¤ects of a small shock to the rate of growth of
money supply on output and asset prices by means of a linear approximation
around the saddle point. Suppose that at time 0 the economy is in a steady
state and an unexpected increase of the rate of growth of money supply makes
A increase from A0 to A1. Assume moreover that the shock is temporary, i.e.
the parameter A goes back to A0 immediately after the shock.
By assumption, the rst round e¤ect of the shock on net worth concerns the
price of land, given the (steady state) landholding of the farmer KF0 . Immedi-
ately after the shock, denoting with A = A1  A0, net worth becomes
nFAS =  (1 A0  A)KF0  A0G
 
K  KF0
 AG   K  KF0 +qtKF0  Rb0:
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Since interest payments have been predetermined on the basis of the steady
state price of land (q0KF0 = Rb
F
0 ) we can write:
G0
 
K  KFt

R
KFt =  (1 A0  A)KF0  A0G
 
K  KF0
 AG   K  KF0 +(qt   q0)KF0
The rate of change of net worth, i.e. of the RHS, is:
n^FAS =   (0   1) A^+ q^t
R
R  1 (48)
where A^ =
A
A0
and 0 :=
0
q0
R
R  1 > 1.
After the shock, the farmers net worth changes for two reasons: the direct
e¤ect of the rate of growth of money supply   (0   1) A^ and the indirect e¤ect
of the rate of growth of money supply on net worth through asset prices q^t
R
R  1 .
This indirect e¤ect is a multiple
R
R  1 of the asset price increase. The direct
e¤ect of the rate of growth of money supply is negative.
Equating (41) and (48) we get:
("0 + 1) K^
F
t =   (0   1) A^+ q^t
R
R  1 (49)
Solving (49) and (45) for q^t and K^Ft yields:
q^t =   (0   1) A^
K^Ft =   (0   1)
R ("0 + 1)  1
(R  1) ("0 + 1) A^
An increase in the rate of change of money supply, has negative e¤ects both on
the rate of change of the farmers landholding and the rate of change of the asset
price. The rate of change of net worth in the end is n^FAS =   (0   1) A^
2R  1
R  1 .
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a model of a monetary economy with nancing
constraints. We borrow some of the basic ingredients of Kiyotaki and Moores
nancial accelerator framework in order to keep the appealing feature of the
intertwined dynamics of asset price changes and borrowing constraints. In or-
der to evaluate the impact of monetary policy, however, we model a monetary
economy with nancing constraints adopting the Money In the Utility function
(MIU) approach.
The basic di¤erence with respect to the original framework is the likely
occurrence of multiple equilibria. A change in the growth rate of money supply
can a¤ect real output through the impact of ination on net worth. In a sense the
29
monetary transmission mechanism we are focusing on consists of a combination
of the ination tax e¤ect and the net worth channel. Contrary to the traditional
view, at least for some parameter congurations, an increase of the ination tax
can bring about an increase of aggregate output.
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